The Effect of Budget Participation on Budgetary Slack with Information Asymmetry, Budget Control and Organizational Commitment as Mediating Variables Study at Private Hospital in Surabaya Marini Purwanto
Catholic University Widya Mandala Surabaya
Abstract
Previous research on the effect of participatory budgeting on budgetary slack produced inconsistent results. This research contributes to the development of agency theory in the practice of budgetary slack in the phenomenon of delegation of authority to subordinates, and contingency theory in organizational behavior. The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of participatory budgeting on budgetary slack with the phenomenon of private hospitals in Surabaya having different characteristics from government hospitals, with budgetary control and information asymmetry and organizational commitment as moderating variables specifically in the private sector in Surabaya. This study uses a questionnaire in data collection and purposive sampling method, namely the actors who make budgets in each hospital work unit represented by the head of the department, head of the work unit at the hospital. The data analysis technique used in this study used a questionnaire that was processed with smart PLS. The results of the analysis show that participatory budgeting does not have a positive effect on budgetary slack, tight budget control weakens the influence of participatory budgeting on budgetary slack, organizational commitment does not mediate the effect of participatory budgeting on budgetary slack and relevant information does not moderate the influence of participatory budgeting on budgetary gaps. The results of this study imply that private hospitals have tighter budget controls than public sector organizations
